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We present an autonomy architecture called Fault Tolerant Remote Agent that integrates 
symbolic reasoning from AI planning/scheduling with physics-based fault-tolerant control.  
Application to spacecraft attitude management in the presence of diverse failure classes is 
studied. We first review fault tolerance in AI and control-theoretic contexts and introduce an 
architecture in which the capabilities of each can be integrated into a more comprehensive fault 
management framework.  We then present fault identification and reconfiguration algorithms 
for a spacecraft attitude control case study.  Simulation results demonstrate good recovery by 
the spacecraft for situations in which controllability is not lost.  These simulations also illustrate 
how logic-based and physics-based algorithms cooperatively achieve a more comprehensive fault 
management capability than would be possible with either algorithm class alone.  
 
Nomenclature 
q        = Spacecraft attitude quaternion with respect to an inertial reference frame (4 elements) 
Ω           = Actual angular velocity vector of spacecraft in a body-fixed frame (3 elements) 
u        = Control force vector in a body fixed frame (3 elements) 
J        = Inertia matrix in a body fixed frame (3×3) 
C        = Control gain matrix (3×3) 
K        = Control gain matrix (3×3) 
x                      =   State vector of the spacecraft in continuous time (7×1) 
xn                    =   Pre-computed nominal state vector in continuous time. 
I                      =   Identity matrix (3×3) 
Xk           =   Discrete State Vector at time step k 
Uk          =   Internal Command Vector at time step k 
U_xk           =   Part of Internal command vector that contain desired position and velocities. 
U_rk           =   Part of Internal command vector that contain desired valve/switch modes. 
(Sup)k          =   Vector of information from Supervisor to the Executive; (Sup)k = [Fk, Pk, Ok, Qk] 
(MI)k            =   Vector of information from Mode ID to the Executive; (MI)k = [F_MIk , P_MIk] 
Fk          =   Fault vector from supervisor or fault detection scheme at time step k 
F_MIk          =   Fault vector from Mode Identification unit at time step k. 
Pk          = Vector containing probability info for each component in Fk 
P_MIk          =   Vector containing probability info for each component in F_MIk 
Ok          =   Variable containing observability information 
Qk          =   Variable containing controllability information 
Mk          =   Variable containing mode information  
FLAG_Supk    =   Variable containing information about reconfiguration permition 
FAIL_flag       =   Variable indicating failure of recovery search by Mode Reconfiguration 
Cmd_RECk   =   Vector containing commands needed for recovery. 
Cmd_MRk     =   Contains information for recovery search; Cmd_MRk = [F_MIk , X_desk, Constrk] 
Constrk               =   Vector encoding Constraints in the system. 
NV          =   Vector of zeros with appropriate size 
Yk          =   Sensor data at time k (from all the sensors throughout the system) 
Note: Subscript k everywhere signifies values of variables and vectors at infinitesimally small time step k. 
 
                                                 
* Graduate Student, Aerospace Engineering, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, email: techibro@umich.edu . 
† Associate Professor, Aerospace Engineering, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, email: ematkins@umich.edu, Associate Fellow. 
AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference
2 - 5 August 2010, Toronto, Ontario Canada
AIAA 2010-8301
Copyright © 2010 by Ali Nasir and Ella Atkins.  Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., with permission.
I Introduction 
Once a spacecraft is launched, its hardware cannot be repaired.  Therefore any component or system 
failure must be managed without replacement parts.  To-date, spacecraft missions have been deployed with 
the ability to execute a “safe” mode transition in which a detected anomaly results in the spacecraft 
deactivating all thrusters and postponing science activities until the situation is resolved by engineers at the 
ground station.   This solution has been sufficient to enable recovery from a variety of hardware and 
software failures so long as the spacecraft faces no immediate risks (e.g., collision) and provided the 
mission can be continued following a potentially extended “safe mode” episode.   
    With extended communication delays, increasingly complex science and maneuver schedules, and 
improved sensing and computational capabilities, future missions will support increased onboard 
autonomy, including autonomous fault management.  Repeated safe mode transitions can be costly to the 
mission; safe mode is also not an option during critical mission phases such as one-time orbit insertions.  
As an Earth-orbiting example, consider a communication satellite tasked with providing coverage of a 
specific high-priority event. If this satellite goes to safe mode during the event (and there is no backup or 
the backup is already in safe mode), substantial loss of revenue could occur, or worse if providing 
communications for an area of unrest or disaster.   
    Two communities of researchers, from control systems and computer science, have studied spacecraft 
fault management with the common goal of robust fault tolerance but in slightly different contexts.  Our 
long-term research goal is to capture and extend pertinent and complementary models and methods from 
both communities to establish a more comprehensive fault management protocol.   In this initial work, we 
present an integrated approach to autonomous fault management that utilizes fault-tolerant control for post-
failure system identification and feedback control coupled with a goal-based mode identification and 
reconfiguration module. We call our proposed architecture “Fault Tolerant Remote Agent” due to our 
adoption of both a fault-tolerant control module integrated with a goal-based mode identification and 
reconfiguration strategy inspired by the Remote Agent architecture successfully deployed on the Deep 
Space One spacecraft just over a decade ago.  The “Remote Agent” component is responsible for 
establishing and adapting task-level plans based on goals and spacecraft state (including health), while the 
fault-tolerant controller is responsible for establishing and maintaining stable attitude (or more generally) 
flight control. Below, we first discuss previous work in spacecraft fault management and fault tolerant 
control.  Next, we present the basic structure, functionality, and implementation of our fault-tolerant remote 
agent (FTRA) architecture.  We describe its application to a spacecraft attitude controller and describe 
results from a case study in which a spacecraft’s attitude maneuvering thruster system experiences one or 
more failure(s). Although we present a specific instantiation of FTRA algorithms, the notion of integrating 
task-level (logic-based) and physics-level adaptation algorithms is general. 
 
II Background 
    Researchers in the artificial intelligence (AI) community have proposed a variety of architectures for 
planning/scheduling and plan execution1.  Most represent state as a list of symbolic (discrete) feature/value 
pairs, enabling search-based algorithms to decompose, select, and sequence activities appropriate for the 
designated task-level goal and the observed system state.  Reasoning, typically based on Markov Decision 
Process models, has become a standard method for building optimal policies that allow an agent to act with 
incomplete or uncertain information about itself or its environment.  Although common in the literature, 
few AI systems have successfully been deployed on space systems due to their computationally-intensive 
deliberative and often difficult to validate nature.  Rather than extensively trade the nontrivial set of AI 
architectures, we primarily reference Remote Agent2,3,4 due to its emphasis on fault detection and 
reconfiguration and its focus on space applications.  Below, we describe this architecture in more detail 
since, although 15 years old, it represents one of the most successful multi-layer AI architectures 
implemented and deployed on a spacecraft.‡
                                                 
‡ Scheduling protocols such as ASPEN developed by JPL have been successfully deployed.  They, however, have 
focused on science data processing with little emphasis on real-time fault management.  In such systems it remains the 
case that a spacecraft with ASPEN typically goes to safe mode rather than automatically classifying and adapting to 
faults. 
 
    Following our description of Remote Agent as a representative AI architecture focusing on fault 
management, we describe fault-tolerant control5,6,7.  Fault-tolerant control represents more traditional 
guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) models in which physical continuous-valued state and control 
input vectors are related through physics-based models to describe the motion of a system through its 
environment.  As described below, fault tolerance is then achieved through a mode-based supervisor and 
control law adaptation. 
 
A. The Remote Agent 
    Researchers from JPL and NASA Ames developed the Remote Agent AI architecture for spacecraft 
mission management2. Remote Agent was tested on the DS-1 spacecraft and consisted of five main 
components including: 1) Planning Experts (PE), 2) Mission Manager (MM), 3) Planner and Scheduler 
(PS), 4) Smart Executive (EXEC), and 5) Mode Identification and Reconfiguration (MIR).  Planning 
Experts (PE) are on-board software modules that assist a task planner/scheduler either by computing 
solutions or by requesting new goals. For example, a navigation PE might request updates to main engine 
thrust goals based on its determination of the spacecraft orbit, and the attitude PE might provide estimated 
duration of specified turns and resulting resource consumption.  
    The Mission Manager (MM) initiates planning/scheduling activities based on the long-term mission 
profile and execution status updates. The executive (EXEC) provides spacecraft status data and requests 
plans from the mission manager.  The mission profile is provided at launch and can be updated from the 
ground. MM determines the goals to achieve during the next mission phase, and combines them with 
current spacecraft status. By adding constraints to the plan request, MM restricts PS to generate only plans 
that are coherent with the overall mission. This decomposition of planning into long-term mission planning 
and short-term task planning enables RA to undertake an extended mission with minimal human 
intervention.  Such multi-resolution planning architectures have previously been used for applications such 
as telescope science scheduling.  
    The planner/scheduler performs Iterative Refinement Search (IRS)8 and chronological backtracking to 
encode a set of methods applicable to extend the existing partial plan. A plan database input to the Heuristic 
Scheduling Testbed System (HSTS)9 framework records the consequences of each problem-solving step 
and performs consistency maintenance and propagation.  Domain constraints are specified in the Domain 
Description Language (DDL)10 within HSTS. Throughout, system state is described as a finite set of 
symbolic state variables with tokens used to describe both action and state literals. PS, a generative planner, 
uses classical search-based planning and scheduling and is efficiently implemented with persistent parallel 
threads.  PS is able to handle non-classical goal types such as periodic goals, accumulation goals, and 
default goals. 
    EXEC is a robust event-driven and multi-threaded plan execution system. It provides a framework in 
which specific mission goals and spacecraft state can be used to customize control, diagnosis, and 
reconfiguration capabilities autonomously. It can request and execute plans involving concurrent and 
interdependent activities potentially with uncertain timing and outcomes. EXEC decomposes planned tasks 
into primitive commands executed closed loop (i.e., as a function of state). This enables the planner to 
reason at a higher level of abstraction.  EXEC’s design also supports close integration between activity 
decomposition and fault response. EXEC is built on the Execution Support Language (ESL)11 providing 
parallel execution, synchronization, error handling, and property locks10. EXEC loads and executes each 
plan while monitoring execution (spacecraft) status through Mode Identification (MI). When a plan is 
completed successfully, EXEC provides current status to MM and asks for a new plan. If task execution 
fails, EXEC puts the spacecraft into safe mode but autonomously asks MM rather than a ground operator 
for an alternate plan (unless MM can no longer resolve the problem in which case ground operators must be 
involved).  EXEC achieves robustness by exploiting flexibility to create and modify plans based on goals 
and observations and by handling execution failures using deductive plan repair  (Mode Reconfiguration 
(MR)).  
    Livingstone12 provided the Mode Identification and Reconfiguration (MIR) functionality of Remote 
Agent. Livingstone is a discrete model-based controller inserted between high-level feed-forward reasoning 
and low level feedback control layers in a physical system. MIR proposes activities to migrate a system 
(spacecraft) to a configuration that achieves a configuration goal. It has a sensing component, Mode 
Identification (MI), and a commanding component, Mode Reconfiguration (MR). Its model is declarative, 
compositional, and stochastic with concurrency support.  Mode Identification tracks changes in spacecraft 
status using input from EXEC as well as a spacecraft system model. It predicts state values and compares 
them with monitored values.  In case of discrepancy, it predicts the malfunction or fault most likely to 
explain the discrepancy. Mode reconfiguration (MR) assists EXEC in generating recovery procedures. On 
the occurrence of a fault, EXEC invokes MR with current fault information from MI. EXEC also provides 
MR with global constraints and goals. MR performs deduction and search in a reactive loop using fast 
propositional reasoning through unit propagation along with conflict directed best-first search. 
   
B. Fault Tolerant Control Systems 
    While the MIR capability of RA can identify and respond to faults via discrete event state (mode) 
models, MIR does not itself regulate continuous force/torque commands, nor does it adapt to properties of 
physics-based models except by switching between pre-specified modes.  The control systems community 
has studied fault management primarily in the context of adapting physical models and control commands. 
A class of architectures known as Fault Tolerant Control System (FTCS) has emerged. A typical FTCS has 
three layers5,6,13. The lowest layer is a reconfigurable feedback control law with state estimator. The middle 
layer is a fault detection and diagnosis (FDD)7 scheme. At the top level is a supervisor that manages 
reconfiguration of the FDD and control layers. 
    FTCS have adopted numerous control law formulations.  In this manuscript we focus on a scheme 
applicable to spacecraft attitude control. Two types of fault tolerant controllers exist: passive strategies 
(robust control)6 and active strategies (controllers for which reconfiguration is based on projection or on-
line controller adaptation).  Passive fault-tolerant control for a spacecraft uses a robust controller, providing 
a baseline upon which an active fault tolerant scheme could be implemented. Since the robustness of a 
controller has an effect on fault detection efficiency, a tradeoff between the two must be established.  An 
active control approach can be implemented using projection or adaptive feedback control approaches6. The 
main purpose of this layer of FTCS is to adapt to anomalous situations and either to restore nominal 
performance, if possible, or gracefully degrade14.  
    Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) predicts faults from residual signals15 based on sensor 
measurements and fault effect models. When the system is fault-free, all residuals should be driven to zero 
by the controller.  An FDD scheme could be based on state or parameter estimation or a mixture of both. 
FDD can be classified into two groups: model-based approaches and data-based approaches6. A fault 
detection and diagnosis scheme should be robust, especially when model-based16. With sound but imperfect 
FDD models or incoming data, missed detections or a false alarm can occur. The decision-making in FDD 
can be made robust using various robustness methods such as statistical data processing, averaging, fuzzy 
decision-making, and adaptive thresholds16,17. Another issue is to distinguish between disturbances, noise, 
and faults. Disturbance decoupling methods can also be applied.  For a complex system such as a 
spacecraft, decoupling of residuals from a set of integrated disturbances sometimes makes the residual 
completely or partially insensitive to some faults. From the point of view of a spacecraft, an FDD scheme 
should be able to detect multiple simultaneous faults, both abrupt and incipient. 
    Supervision is the top FTCS layer and is responsible for reconfiguration decisions based on information 
from FDD and its own reasoning algorithms. Supervision schemes have been developed to manage 
diagnostic information and on-line controller restructuring. Supervision modules have been implemented 
with methods6,5 including Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)5, Intelligent Computing, Fuzzy Logic, 
Neuro-Computing, Genetic algorithms, and Probabilistic reasoning. FMEA models the effect of faults on 
observable system parameters by providing data on how each fault impacts these parameters.  The 
supervisor can be implemented using extended state machine5 or parallel state machine logic with transition 
probabilities based on knowledge of the system. 
 
C. Representational Gaps 
    We seek to establish the most complete fault management architecture possible, but we also seek a 
tractable solution that avoids (or minimizes) duplication of calculations.  As a start, we compare the AI-
derived Remote Agent architecture and fault-tolerant control for a spacecraft. Remote Agent models a 
spacecraft as a concurrent transition system with multiple components and operating modes, while FTCS 
models the spacecraft as a rigid or flexible body with associated kinematics and dynamics.  Both rely on 
sensor data fused into state estimates and translated to control output, where “control” is defined for 
Remote Agent as general action primitives and for a FTCS as a vector of physical servo/motor commands.  
RA reasons about spacecraft components and their interactions but typically does not manipulate physical 
dynamics/kinematics parameters. On the other hand, FTCS can reason on the basis of equations of motion 
but is unable to reason about component interactions and task-level algorithm or software implementation 
properties. This difference establishes representational gaps in both architectures. One might be tempted to 
bridge these gaps by extending the capabilities of either RA or FTCS. Incorporating dynamics and 
kinematics reasoning in symbolic models is possible but difficult due to the tradeoff in [discrete model] 
resolution versus search-space tractability. On the other hand, incorporating qualitative component and 
interconnection details in FTCS not only requires a state-based supervision architecture that can reason 
about system-wide interactions but also the ability to reconfigure (replan) based on component failures and 
events associated with components  such as communication channels, processing elements, the payload, 
etc. We propose an alternative in which representational gaps are filled by integrating remote agent with 
fault tolerant control, allowing each to fill gaps in the other architecture.    
    Below, we introduce the resulting architecture i.e., Fault Tolerant Remote Agent (FTRA). We then 
present a simple example of spacecraft attitude management illustrating how the integrated system 
synergistically models and reasons about component and control-centric faults. 
 
III Fault Tolerant Remote Agent 
A. The Architecture 
Figure 1 shows the Fault Tolerant Remote Agent (FTRA) architecture.  Since a Remote Agent-class AI 
architecture would be attached to the feedback control system of a spacecraft, the most natural way of 
incorporating FTCS  is to replace the single traditional controller with a three layer FTCS, illustrated in 
detail in Figure 2. In the new architecture, the commands from Remote Agent’s EXEC are passed to the 
FTCS supervisor. Fault information from the FTCS FDD is forwarded to EXEC through the supervisor. 
The monitored values from the sensors along with FDD information are conveyed to MI. Since MI and 
FDD have different model representations, data must be translated before it is delivered from FDD to MI 
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        The merger of FTCS and RA introduces new communication channels. The first is between EXEC 
and supervisor; the second is between FDD and MI. EXEC transmits task-level commands to the 
supervisor in cases where such commands can influence FTCS operational mode (e.g., selecting a different 
control mode due to a different rate or mode of motion).  EXEC can also communicate MIR results to the 
supervisor, guiding the supervisor’s choice of control options based on failed or reconfigured components 
or goals.   For this discussion we presume the supervisor is implemented with FMEA extended state 
machine logic. FMEA determines and transfers its state (describing the fault’s effects) to EXEC. It can also 
transfer the probabilities of other faulty or normal states based on the current state of the spacecraft and the 
FMEA uncertainty model. Since EXEC now has access to two sources of fault information and two models 
capable of reconfiguration, it has the choice of allowing or disallowing reconfiguration of the supervisor 
control loop, or altering invocation of or parameters in MIR. Ideally MIR and the FTCS supervisor would 
handle a comprehensive and non-overlapping fault set, but in practice there will likely be overlap to be 
studied here and in our future work.  Below we present initial interfaces and demonstrate their use for 
spacecraft attitude control fault management.  While overlapping fault sets between MIR and the supervisor 
may be difficult to manage, as discussed below these independent modules also provide a means of 








   
 
Figure 3: Communication links in FTRA 
     
Figure 3 illustrates the integration of the Remote Agent (RA) and fault-tolerant control (FTC) layers.  For 
simplicity the planning/scheduling (PS) layer of RA is omitted in the above figure since its only direct 
connection to layers in Figure 3 is through the RA executive (EXEC).  Recall that RA included executive 
(EXEC), mode/fault identification (MI), and mode/fault reconfiguration (MR) components.  Similarly, 
recall that FTC consisted of supervisor (Sup), fault detection and diagnosis (FDD), and reconfigurable 
control (RC) layers.  Connections of RC to sensors and actuators in its environment are omitted in the 
figure for simplicity.  The two communication layers connecting RA and FTC layers are a focus of our 
work. The FDD/MI interface maximizes information redundancy to facilitate fault diagnosis/identification 
decisions and minimize the potential of reaching contradicting conclusions with FDD vs. MI. When MI 
detects an anomaly by comparing monitored with predicted data, it uses a declarative compositional 
probabilistic concurrent transition model to determine the fault set that justifies the anomaly.  With 
additional data from FDD, it can double-check the identified fault by comparing its conclusion with that of 
FDD. Similarly, FDD can incorporate fault information from MI into its fault detection algorithm to justify 
a decision of fault. With this strategy, each is using the output of the other but neither MI nor FDD is aware 
of the other’s inference process.  We consider this a plausible first implementation, particularly given that 
computed probabilities  are shared between the two modules.  We recognize that correlation of internal 
process may improve efficiency and accuracy in future extensions, although substantial correlation of 
process might compromise solution independence and the associated system-level robustness.   
    There are several issues to address in MI/FDD integration.  First, even in cases where MI and FDD 


















Next, either one could be wrong in its conclusion, resulting in contradictory results.  Third, some faults 
(e.g., related to changes in kinematics/dynamics) may only be detectable by FDD, while MI might 
exclusively detect failures not related to physical motion sensing or actuation.  Finally, since, EXEC is 
responsible for the resolution of discrepancies, it must be maximally-informed by both the MI and FDD 
processes.   
   Information exchange between MI and FDD can be useful in a number of ways. Fault information from 
one layer can strengthen certainty of conclusions in the other, e.g. when FDD residuals are close to the 
detection threshold, or when two or more MI anomalies have similar probabilities.   As discussed above, 
agreement between MI and FDD conclusions certainly will strengthen confidence of the diagnosis. Also, 
each can alert the other upon anomaly detection, which may impact the decision-making parameters as well 
as the decision itself.   Together, information exchange supports resolution of discrepancy between the two 
schemes, exploits faster detection of a fault by one layer, and builds confidence/robustness of the decision 
in cases of agreement between the two schemes.    During normal operation, EXEC will execute the current 
plan and receive system health and state updates from MI and the FTCS supervisor. MI can detect a 
significant spectrum of faults observable from discrepancies between predicted and actual state due to its 
flexible compositional constraint-based modeling with concurrent transition support. On the other hand, 
FDD concentrates on discrepancies in continuous-time state, not in components or logical state. For 
example, the FTCS will have model a thruster in terms of the force it can apply and fuel it consumes, but it 
would have no information about the valves used to supply fuel to the thrusters.§
    Regardless of which identifies the fault, both MI and FTCS send fault data to EXEC. EXEC invokes MR 
by default, except in cases where only FDD has identified the control-centric fault condition.  EXEC will 
monitor the FTCS supervisor’s reconfiguration activities and invoke planning/scheduling activities in cases 
where its original task set may no longer be valid given supervisor/FDD fault management decisions (e.g., 
a reduced control authority mode will no longer support completion of a particular task). To arbitrate, 
EXEC must have a mapping of faults MI and FDD can detect, along with a strategy (e.g., a simple priority 
or confidence measure) for arbitrating between two contradicting results. This situation generally can occur 
either due to MI or FDD being incapable of detecting the fault, or due to discrepancies in the MI vs. FDD 
models.   For example, the former case would be present with a stuck thruster valve.  In this case MI would 
conclude that the valve is stuck, while FDD would conclude that the thruster is not functioning (without 
further diagnosis).  While neither conclusion is incorrect, in this case EXEC’s confidence/conclusion 
mapping would indicate the “stuck valve” diagnosis was a more descriptive (thus useful) diagnosis.  MR 
would then be invoked to respond appropriately.   
 Other examples FDD 
would be unlikely to detect include component overheating, or science equipment defects. 
    EXEC (with feedback from MR) will invoke the planner/scheduler module in cases where existing goal-
level tasks become infeasible due to a diagnosed fault, or more generally when a particular set of goals has 
been accomplished.  In cases where EXEC needs a new plan and the planner/scheduler requires additional 
deliberation time, EXEC itself will be capable of transitioning the spacecraft into safe mode.  Rather than 
involving ground personnel (which of course would still be an option in some situations), the 
planner/scheduler then re-plans, considering the effects of identified faults as well as the mission goals and 
domain model.  In cases where MI and FDD conclusions cannot possibly be consistent even after 
consideration of shared data and with tolerance of uncertainties, EXEC will request ground operator input. 
 
IV Case Study: Fault Tolerant Attitude Management 
    The FTRA architecture described above has been translated into a prototype implementation to 
demonstrate FTRA functionality. In this section we present a simple example of spacecraft attitude control 
using FTRA to diagnose and reconfigure to a small but diverse set of anomalies.  Attitude control is 
required for most spacecraft and is perhaps one of the most critical real-time control functions executed 
onboard a spacecraft.  Attitude control is also of relevance for our case study because fault-tolerant 
performance has previously been studied separately in the context of MIR and FTCS.   For our scenario, a 
simple cubical spacecraft (CubeSat)**
                                                 
§ A spacecraft thruster valve application was in fact one of the original Livingstone case studies12.   
 structure is presumed. An onboard telescope is capable of imaging 
the solar system and distant celestial objects.  We study a particular mission segment in which EXEC has 
initiated a pointing task commanding the spacecraft to reorient toward a particular celestial object (e.g., a 
** We use the term CubeSat as a general name for small-scale satellites potentially benefiting from a FTRA capability; 
our research is not connected to any particular CubeSat programs. 
mapped asteroid) and take a series of images. We assume spacecraft attitude is adjusted only through low-
magnitude thrusters affixed to each CubeSat face, and that CubeSat is a rigid body with constant mass and 
inertia. 
 
A. Spacecraft Model 
    The dynamics and kinematics spacecraft models for FTCS are formulated below, followed by 
presentation of a compositional qualitative model used by the RA layers.  Spacecraft attitude state is 
represented by a four-element quaternion vector q and angular velocity Ω.  Equation (1) describes the 
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Above, Ω = [Ω1 Ω2 Ω3]T is the angular velocity vector of the spacecraft in a body-fixed frame, q = [q1 q2 q3 
q4]T is the quaternion vector  with q = [q1 q2 q3]T and scalar component q4. R in alternate of equation (1) is 3 
by 3 rotation matrix.  Note that in simulations we verified that a rotation matrix formulation yields identical 
results, providing some validation of our simulation code.  Control inputs are body-axis torques u1, u2 and 
u3 generated by thruster pairs imparting opposite forces presumed to have no translation component. 

















































         
 
where u = [u1 u2 u3] T, R is 3 by 3 rotation matrix and rij is the element of R belonging to column j and row 
i. 
 
Below a compositional qualitative spacecraft model is presented for the thruster/valve system in which 
faults will be injected.  Note that the full spacecraft RA model is beyond the scope of this paper. As shown 
in Figure 4, we assume our spacecraft is equipped with six thrusters (one per CubeSat face) arranged such 
that pairs of thrusters provide torques about x, y, and z axes.  The spacecraft has nine thruster valves, three 
per thruster pair, and nine pressure sensors, one for each valve. Each propulsion system component is a 
state variable with different modes and associated constraints.  Appropriate states, constraints, and sample 

















Figure 4: Thruster-Valve Scheme 
 
Table 1: Example Spacecraft States 
States Modes 
Ti Normal {On, Off}, failed {No Thrust} 
Vi Normal {Open, Shut}, Failed {Stuck open, 
Stuck shut} 
Pi Normal {0-5V}, Failed {Constant 0V or 5V} 
 
Table 2: Example Thruster Constraints 
Modes Constraints 
T1(On) Valve V1(On) or V2(On) and, V3(On)  
T1(Off) Valve V3(Off)   
Table 3: Example Mode Transition Probabilities 
Component Mode Transition Probabilities 
Ti PFF = 0.99, PFN = 0.01, PNN = 0.95, PNF = 0.05 
Vi PFF = 0.95, PFN = 0.05, PNN = 0.80, PNF = 0.2 
Pi PFF = 0.8, PFN = 0.2, PNN = 0.85, PNF = 0.15 
 
 
B. Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) 
    Fault detection is implemented using a multi level residual generation and testing technique. On the first 






nominal trajectories based on normal and faulty modes. On the second level, we generate fault rejection 
number Nij for each fault case i and each state variable j.  The fault rejection number is 1 if the residual 
from the first level crosses a threshold (h) which in our case is five times the anticipated disturbance and 
additive noise together (i.e. h = 5×10-6) and 0 otherwise.  Note that Nij is 0 when state j of the actual 
spacecraft agrees with the corresponding state of nominal mode i. On the third level, a fault hypothesis F is 
generated if the fault rejection number for a particular fault is less than a second threshold (v ϵ {0.9, 1.9, … 
m-0.1}), where m is the number of states, 7 in our case study.  v depicts how many states are in agreement 
with a given nominal model.  In our case a value v of 0.9 means that all seven spacecraft states agree (i.e., 
fewer than 0.9 states disagree with values predicted from a nominal model).  In this case we hypothesize 
that particular model to be the true model of the spacecraft. Equation (4) shows these computations: 





























































=         (4) 
where  j ϵ {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} and i ϵ {0,1,2,3…n} with n the number of anticipated faults (0 means normal). 
Finally, if a hypothesis persists for a selected time window (in our case 1 sec), the fault is confirmed. 
 
C. Reconfigurable Control Strategy 
    Our reconfigurable controller is comprised of a database of pre-computed control laws selectable from 




Figure 5: Multiple models Reconfiguration 
Figure 5 shows our scheme is projection-based i.e., we have pre-computed models of the system with 
expected faults. When an FDD-identified fault is confirmed by the supervisor and EXEC concurs with its 
reconfiguration, the dynamic model is replaced and the controller is redesigned according to the new 
dynamics. There are eight possible combinations of nominal and failed thruster states representing the fact 
that each of the three thruster pairs can be either normal or failed. Here, we will show simulations for only 
one case that covers the three cases of loss-of-torque (thrust) about one of the three axes due to thruster 
valve failure. These three faults are characterized by u = [u1 u2 0] T, u = [0 u2 u3] T, and u = [u1 0 u3] T.  Our 
attitude control strategy is derived in Appendix 1. In this appendix we provide control laws for a sequence 
of maneuvers that can reorient the spacecraft from an arbitrary initial state to a desired attitude and zero 
angular velocities given each of the specified fault scenarios. It might appear to the reader that these 
maneuvers take the spacecraft from arbitrary state to the equilibrium state i.e. [0 0 0 1 0 0 0]T but in fact we 
can use the same laws for any arbitrary desired pointing by defining quaternion components in the control 
law to be the  error between initial and desired quaternion components (see 29 for detail).  
 
D. The Supervisor 
    The supervisor is implemented using FMEA combined with extended state machine (ESM) logic. The 
example transition probabilities used in our simulations are given in Table 4.  In this table, Faults 1, 2, and 
3 correspond to loss of one, two and then three torque directions respectively.  We assume identical 
probabilities of failure for the different torque axes, but indicate an increased likelihood of a second and 
third torque failure once the first is observed.  The probability numbers used are equivalent for any ordering 
in which progressive loss-of-torque failures occur.  This table is not complete in a sense that it does not 
cover all seven failure states but it covers all three categories of those seven failure modes i.e, single, 
double and triple failures.  
Table 4: Example Fault Transition Probabilities 
 Normal Fault 1 Fault 2 Fault 3 
Fault1 0.01 0.97 0 0 
Fault 2 0.005 0.02 0.96 0 
Fault 3 0.002 0.01 0.04 1 
Normal 0.983 0 0 0 
 
    Each fault column represents probabilities of possible transitions from the corresponding fault to other 
faults or to itself.  Occurrence of a fault is an event that prompts the supervisor to possibly switch “health” 
states. When FDD detects a fault, the supervisor checks for fault convergence. If the fault persists for 
appreciable time, it sends a message to EXEC with indicating the fault and the level of confidence in this 
fault state. EXEC will continue to monitor the supervisor and manage any associated reconfiguration, while 
the supervisor simply switches the system model and control strategy according to the next fault condition.  
Figure 6 shows the supervisor algorithm. Here, subscript k indicates the time step.  Fk represents the fault 
vector, yk and uk are output and input vectors of the dynamic system respectively at time step k, M is the 
mode or finite state corresponding to no fault (0) or one of the faults (1-3) described above. Variable x is 
the continuous state vector, and Pk represents the probabilities associated with faults at time step k using 
Table 4 as the initial probability distribution.  Qk and Ok are variables carrying local controllability and 
observability properties respectively at time step k, where 0 indicates no controllability/observability, 1 
indicates accessibility/distinguishability and 2 indicate full controllability/observability). FMEA 























Figure 6:  Supervisor Algorithm for the Spacecraft Attitude Control Case Study 
Supervisor: 
Input:  Fk=[F1k,F2k,F3k],  yk, uk, FLAG_Supk 
Output:  Mk={0,1,2,3}, U_xk = [x_des], Pk=[Pk(F1), Pk(F2), Pk(F3)] 
[Ok, Qk] FMEA (Fk, yk, uk) 
if (FLAG_Supk == 1) 
send_RC (Mk, U_xk) 
else 
send_RC (0, U_xk) 
If (Fk != [0,0,0]) 




(SUP)k[Fk, Pk, Qk, Ok] 
End Main 
FMEA: 
Input:  Fk=[F1k,F2k,F3k], yk, uk 
Output:  Ok={0,1,2}, Qk={0,1,2} 
Set Bk and Gk for Fk 
Ok = observability(yk, uk ) 




E. EXEC Implementation 
    EXEC is implemented using the algorithm shown below in Figure 7. At the start of an execution cycle, 
the current partial plan is loaded into EXEC. At each iteration or time step k, EXEC receives system 
updates and health status through MI ((MI)k) and the Supervisor ((Sup)k). In case of a fault, two situations 
may take place:  either there is a conflict between FDD fault and MI fault, or there is no conflict. In case of 
conflict, fault transition and mode transition probabilities provided by the Supervisor and MI respectively 
are utilized along with the qualitative EXEC spacecraft model (e.g., confidence in FDD vs. MI to correctly 
diagnose each fault) to deduce the most likely fault(s). Recovery actions may be executed through MR 
(U_Xrk), the Supervisor (U_xk, FLAG_supk), or both. In case of an un-reconcilable situation, EXEC puts 
the spacecraft in safe mode and invokes the Mission Manager (planner/scheduler) for an alternate plan 
based on the current situation. If no appropriate plan can be found, the worst case, ground operators are 
contacted to resolve the conflict.  In case of no fault or consistent diagnoses by MI and FDD, the normal or 
fault-accommodation execution cycle is continued, i.e., EXEC commands are executed according to the 
current plan.    
    In Figure 7, matrix Uk represents EXEC commands at time step k.  Commands might be part of the 
normal execution sequence part of a recovery sequence, depending upon the situation.  In both cases, 
command format is Uk = [U_xk, U_rk] where U_xk specifies continuous-time reference state for the attitude 
controller and second U_rk  specifies commands to discrete controllers such as switches, valves, etc. 
Cmd_MRk contains information such as Fault information, desired state, and constraints (Cmd_MRk = 
[F_MIk , X_desk, Constrk]) that MR uses in finding recovery procedure if there is one. Cmd_RECk 
specifies commands that can take the spacecraft back to normal mode, these commands are essentially 
given to the switches or valves in the form of U_rk. Xk represents the discrete state vector in representing 




















Figure 7: EXEC’s Fault Recovery Algorithm 
F. MIR Implementation  
    MIR is implemented using the algorithm set illustrated in Figure 8 and described in Figure 9. MI predicts 
spacecraft states based on the spacecraft model and EXEC inputs.  Predicted states are then compared with 
the current state to identify any anomalous situation. In the case of fault, the MI result is compared with 
data from FDD. .  MR receives fault information from EXEC along with constraints and goals. It performs 
model-based search for the best reconfiguration strategy with real-time updates from MI and forwards the 
proposed solution to EXEC 
Algorithm for EXEC: 
Inputs: (Sup)k = [Fk, Pk, Ok, Qk], (MI)k = [F_MIk , P_MIk], Cmd_RECk 
Outputs: FLAG_supk, Cmd_MRk, Uk  
Start_Plan  (t_des, Xk) 
loop: do 
 Is_FAULTk Check_Faults ((MI)k, (Sup)k) 
 If (Is_Empty(Is_FAULTk): 
  Send_Commands (Compute_Commands(X_desk, t_des))  // sends Uk = [U_xk, U_rk] 
 Else: 
  CONFk Check_Conflict (Fk, F_MIk) 
  [FLAG_supk ,Cmd_MRk] Resolve_for_Recovery(Fk, F_MIk , CONFk) 
  Cmd_RECk Invok_MR (Cmd_MRk) 
  Send_Rec_Commands (Cmd_RECk, FLAG_supk) 
End of loop 
 
 
Figure 8: MIR Block Diagram 
 
The Figure 9 variables have the same meanings as those defined in Figures 6 and 7; additionally, y is the 
output vector at time step k from all the sensors in the spacecraft including attitude control sensors and 
valve pressure sensors and NV means null values or zeros.  In this work we presume valves are either open 
or shut, functioning or stuck open or shut, so valves are controlled with discrete rather than continuous 













Figure 9: MIR Algorithms 
 
Algorithm for MI: 
Inputs: Yk , Uk 
Outputs: (MI)k = [F_MIk, P_MIk, Xk] 
X_estk   PredictState (Xk-1, Uk-1) 
F_MIk Compare (X_estk, Yk, Fk) 
If (Not_Empty (F_MIk)): 
Xk  Update_State (F_MIk, Xk-1) 
P_MIk  Update Probabilities F_MIk, Xk, Xk-1) 
(MI)k [F_MIk, P_MIk, Xk] 
Else: 
Xk  X_estk 
(MI)k  [Xk, NV] 
Send_EXEC ((MI)k)   //End 
 
 
Algorithm for MR: 
Inputs: Cmd_MRk = [F_MIk , X_desk, Constrk], (MI)k, Xk 
Outputs: Cmd_RECk, FAIL_flag 
Cmd_RECk Search_Algorithm(Cmd_MRk, Xk) 
If (Is_Solved (Cmd_MRk, Cmd_RECk)): 
 Send_EXEC (Cmd_RECk) 
Else: 




    Below, we present simulation results for our selected fault case. We implemented all algorithms in 
MATLAB for this work.   In our simulation, the rigid CubeSat is commanded to conduct an attitude 
maneuver from   q = [0.5 0.5 0.5]T, q4 = -0.5 to q = [0 0 0]T, q4 = -1.  For our satellite J1 = 1700 kg·m2, J2 = 
2000 kg·m2, and J3 = 1400 kg·m2. We constrain the time allowed to complete the maneuver to 500 sec, and 
the initial velocities are presumed to be Ω0 = [0.1 0.15 0.2]T. EXEC sends the desired maneuver to the 
FTCS reconfigurable controller, but in our initial case study there is no thrust in u3 (i.e., no torque about 
the z axis) due to a valve being stuck.  This fault is detectable by both MI and FDD, but FDD detects it as 
thruster failure while MI detects it as a valve failure. EXEC receives fault information from the Supervisor 
and MIR. EXEC sends the potential “valve failure” information to MR, given that this diagnosis is 
consistent with and more expressive than the “thruster failure” result from FDD.  MR in return suggests 
valve reconfiguration. EXEC reconfigures the thruster values per the MR result, thereby regaining control 
authority. In the plots shown in Figures 10 and 11, reconfiguration is initiated at t = 5 sec. Since the 
mission-level goal was to achieve the desired pointing attitude within 500 sec, our results indicate that, with 
our proposed scheme, the goal has been achieved. Note that the control gains were not changed during this 
process since MR was able to restore functionality without Supervisor reconfiguration.  This illustrates 
MIR utility distinct from FTCS functionality. In the Figure 10-12 plots, the green lines indicate 
reconfigured trajectories, while red lines illustrate behavior without valve reconfiguration.  For comparison, 
the normal no-fault trajectory is plotted in blue.  Although the failure does introduce additional transient, 
reconfiguration enables the system to regain performance comparable to the no-fault condition in this case. 
We have also presented the results using an alternative rotation matrix formulation (Figure 11), yielding 
results consistent with quaternion-based trends. 
 
To complete the demonstration of our idea, we also present the case where the thrusters related to u3 fail. In 
that case, both MI and FDD are still able to detect the fault and this time there is no conflict between their 
diagnoses i.e. both schemes detect this situation as thruster failure. Now MR has no way of bringing the 
spacecraft to any graceful configuration, so EXEC commands controller reconfiguration and the new 
control laws shown in Appendix 2 are invoked.  Results are shown in Figures 13-16. Note that we used a 
discontinuous control strategy because although the spacecraft is locally controllable, it cannot be 
asymptotically stabilized to any equilibrium attitude using time invariant continuous feedback29. Another 
noticeable difference here is that the rotation matrix based controller completes the maneuver slightly 
earlier than the quaternion based controller.  This is due to the presence of alternate ways to maneuver to 




Figure 10: Quaternion Values for Valve Failure and Reconfiguration case 
 





Figure 12: Angular Velocities for Valve Failure and Reconfiguration case 
 
Figure 13: Quaternion Values for Thruster Failure Case 
 
Figure14: Rotation matrix values for thruster failure case 
 
Figure 15: Angular Velocities for Thruster Failure Case (using quaternion based control) 
 
Figure16: Angular Velocities for Thruster Failure Case (using Rotation matrix based control) 
 
V Conclusions and Future Work 
    In this paper we have proposed the integration of Remote Agent, an AI planning/scheduling architecture 
with fault management capability, with a fault-tolerant feedback control system to provide a general fault 
management solution capable of identifying and executing both logic-based and continuous state 
reconfiguration strategies.  We have demonstrated application to fault-tolerant spacecraft attitude control.  
The proposed scheme offers a number of advantages, at a cost of increased architectural and model 
complexity. Some advantages include increased fault coverage, increased reliability through redundancy, 
handling of fault propagation, ability to autonomously recover, and handling of concurrent faults.    
Computational complexity tradeoffs are dependent on model complexity and overhead and must be further 
analyzed in future work.  Both RA and FTC may require computationally-intensive search to identify or 
optimize a solution, but particularly if executed in parallel overhead may not be substantial compared to 
either RA or FTC executing alone since complexity order does not increase given independent execution 
threads.  Additionally, RA and FTC models may be marginally simpler since faults most naturally 
expressed in the other’s representation need not be fit into the alternate architecture (except when needed 
for redundancy).   
    The benefits to the integrated fault-tolerant remote agent (FTRA) versus either RA or FTC managing 
faults alone depend on several factors. First, if the level of autonomous decision-making is low, an AI 
approach may not be warranted; it may instead be feasible for a fault-tolerant controller to make 
adaptations to ensure stability while the human operator manages other reconfiguration decisions.  
Conversely, if system dynamics are trivial (e.g., a stationary plant where “decisions” are in terms of data, 
not actuation) there is no role for FTC.  Increasingly-sophisticated Aerospace platforms will incorporate all 
the decision layers found in FTRA thus we are confident an integrated architecture such as what has been 
proposed in this work is broadly applicable.   
    In practice, a variety of algorithms could be implemented in the different FTRA layers provided they are 
capable of computing the designated output.  Although we have investigated the FTRA architecture in the 
context of specific algorithms, its structure is generalizable to others.  The problem of validation and 
verification (V&V) becomes ever more difficult as module and architecture complexity increases.  Even 
when software implementing algorithms internal to each layer completes a V&V process, the new 
communications, including arbitration between potentially-disparate conclusions, introduces a new 
challenge.  From a practical implementation standpoint, while the integration of deliberative AI and FTC 
algorithms enables capture and management of a more comprehensive fault set, increased complexity also 
increases risk of unanticipated execution sequences due to unpredicted interactions.  A formidable but 
surmountable challenge is then to ensure the integrated system is validated. 
    As a multidisciplinary architecture, FTRA will require team-based adaptation to any domain, with 
composition of experts in both symbolic inference and adaptation (AI) and physics-based control systems.  
This may be a negative for small projects, although the authors argue any goal-based system with nontrivial 
dynamics requires participation from both communities today, just in segregated modules presumed to 
work with little to no knowledge of the other.  From the Aerospace perspective, even if/when a FTRA-class 
implementation matures, the community must accept the increased level of autonomy offered for the FTRA 
to find its way into missions.  NASA’s now decade-old demonstration of Remote Agent (RA) illustrated 
both the power and challenge of onboard deliberation.  Time delay and limited communication bandwidth 
(e.g., from deep space) will ultimately drive this migration.  Only by building the algorithms and interfaces, 
including sound and tractable means of validation, will we be prepared to transition to a level of onboard 
autonomy that truly makes a ground station link optional even when faults occur.   
    As a start, this paper has mapped “AI deliberation and execution” processes to the Remote Agent 
architecture, motivated in part by its capabilities and in part by its previous use in a spacecraft.  While this 
choice has been a convenient beginning to integration of AI deliberation and FTC, we also encourage and 
hope to conduct additional work to map other deliberation strategies into analogous integrated structures 
promoting synergistic task-level and motion-level fault management.   
    In our future work, we will more formally address arbitration between FDD and MI, particularly when 
independent conclusions are not consistent.  This will likely require sharing additional statistical data as 
well as the list of conclusions each module has reached.  Longer-term, we plan to build benchmark 
comparisons of FTRA performance with respect to RA alone, FTC alone, and ground-based supervision 
(user reconfiguration).  Metrics will include fault diagnosis delay and correctness, reconfiguration delay, 
and post-reconfiguration performance. Our goal is to not only demonstrate increased capabilities but also to 
understand the tradeoffs and challenges associated with an integrated architecture of the class we propose 
in this paper. 
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Appendix 1: Reconfigured Control29 
This appendix presents an attitude stabilization method based on eight maneuvers using control torques 
along two principal axes only. The post-fault equations of motion are same as given by (1) and (2) except 
u3 is now identically zero.   When executed sequentially these eight maneuvers can transition a spacecraft 
from an arbitrary initial state to any desired final attitude. Note that each succeeding maneuver inherits 
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Where  k > 0 (in our simulations k = 0.01). Execute this maneuver until approximately zero angular 
velocity is reached along the controlled axis and an arbitrary angular velocity, say Ω3*, is achieved along 




[ ] ( )[ ]




































































 Execute this maneuver until angular velocity Ω3*/2 is achieved along the uncontrolled axis (in  the above 





Execute maneuver 1 again until all three velocities become zero (In the above simulation, this took 24 sec). 
 
Maneuver 4: 
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Execute this maneuver until the function given by z1 above reaches zero (this corresponds to zero roll angle 
of the spacecraft if we convert the quaternion vector into Euler angles. In our case Ω1 is the roll angular 
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Execute this maneuver until the function given by z1 above reaches zero (this corresponds to zero pitch 
angle of the spacecraft if we convert the quaternion vector into Euler angles. In our case Ω2 is the pitch 
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Execute this maneuver until the function given by z1 above reaches zero; this corresponds to roll angle of 
the spacecraft equal to pi/2, if we convert the quaternion vector into Euler angles. In our simulations, this 
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Execute this maneuver until the function given by z1 above reaches zero (this corresponds to yaw angle of 
the spacecraft equal to zero, if we convert the quaternion vector into Euler angles. In above simulations, 
this maneuver took 56 sec (the same maneuver took 30 seconds for the rotation matrix based controller as 
can be noticed from figures 14 and 16). 
 
Maneuver 8: 
Finally, execute maneuver 4 until the desired final state, 𝒙 = [𝒒   𝛀] = [0 0 0    −1 0 0 0] , is 
reached.  Note that, if we replace q by 𝒒� in above control laws, where 𝒒� is given by the relation below, our 
final attitude would be 𝒙𝒅 = [𝒒𝒅   𝛀] = [𝑞𝑑1 𝑞𝑑2 𝑞𝑑3    𝑞𝑑4 0 0 0]  whereas after 8 maneuvers we 











































































Appendix 2: FMEA Definitions22 
   Below is a summary of the mathematics used to calculate observability and controllability for our non-
linear spacecraft attitude dynamics model. Consider two vector fields f(x) and g(x) in n-dimensional 
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Definition 1: 
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is locally accessible about an arbitrary state xo if the accessibility distribution C spans n space, where n is 
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The gi terms are analogous to the B terms in linear dynamic system BuAxx +=  and the [f,gi] terms 
correspond to the AB terms in the corresponding controllability matrix for linear systems. Nonzero [gi,gj] 
terms arise from the nonlinear system properties.  Note that if f(x) = 0 then C having rank n implies 
controllability. 
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In equation (10) qJ ,,Ω represent inertia, angular velocity and quaternion components. 
 
For observability we first define a Lie Derivative. Notice that, any actuator failure will reduce control input 
vector rank (m) but the form of the system remains the same. Let f be an n-dimensional vector field, 


























∂         (18) 
where, f is given by 
[ ]Tnfffff ...321=  
and scalar h is h(x) where x is the n dimensional state vector). 




















  where k ≥ 1       (19) 








   for p ≤ n        (20) 
 
Definition 2: 
    Let G denote the set of all finite linear combinations of the Lie derivatives of h1,…,hp with respect to f 
for various values of u = constant. Let G∇  denote the set of all their gradients. If we can find n linearly 
independent vectors within G∇ , then the system is locally observable.  We can put the above theorem in 
mathematical form as follows.  The system is locally observable at any state xo if there exists some 










*  has rank n, the dimension of x           (21) 
where 
[ ]Tpnfnfpffo hLhLhLhLuxl )(...)(...)(...)(),( 111010* −−≡           
Note that, two states xo and x1 are distinguishable if there exists an input function u* such that: 
z(xo) ≠ z(x1). 
 











           (22) 
 
Notice that the effect of sensor failure would be a reduction in p. 
 
